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According to our model eﬀective ‘budgetary’ separation of power occurs in the
states with the line-item veto when the Governor is not aligned with the Legis-
lature. Only then is the Legislature, which approves the budget and sets the tax
level, not the full residual claimant of a tax increase. The tax level is determined by
the overlap between the supporters of the Governor and the supporters of the leg-
islative majority. The model generates a discontinuous and non-linear relationship
between the tax level and the degree of alignment between Governor and Legisla-
ture. We ﬁnd support in the data for this non-linear relationship and show that
the discontinuity can be interpreted as a causal eﬀect.
JEL: H00, H11, H20, H30, H71.
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1The goal of this paper is to propose a simple bargaining model through which the
formal separation of powers between Governors and Legislatures aﬀects the size of govern-
ment in the U.S. states. To test our model we estimate a partially linear model between
the degree of political alignment and the tax level.1 Control variables and state and year
dummies enter the model linearly, whereas the variable that captures the degree of sup-
port the Governor has in the Legislature is allowed to be non-linear. We use a regression
discontinuity design to show that the positive jump in the tax level at the point where
the government goes from divided to uniﬁed can be interpreted causally. The model we
propose is able to give a rational for the non-linear relationship and discontinuity we
estimate.
The way in which we model separation of powers builds on Persson et al. (2000). In
the ﬁrst model presented in Persson et al. (2000) the same representative controls both
the tax level and the allocation of resources. In the second, one representative is assigned
the power to raise taxes with another having the power to allocate resources. The tax
level is lower in the latter model. What drives their result is that the representative with
the power to decide the tax level is not the residual claimant of a tax increase. That is to
say that the representative who decides on the tax level is unable to pocket the marginal
increase in tax revenue for herself themselves or her constituency.
Similarly to Persson et al. (2000), we model the budget process between the two
branches of government as a sequential bargaining game. We show that the line-item
veto power2 held by most Governors in the American states prevents the Legislature,
the deciding body on both the tax level and the allocation of resources,3 from being the
1For other applications of the partially linear model see Engle et al. (1986) and
Schmalensee and Stoker (1999)
2The line-item veto and allows the Governor to veto particular items and words, or to trim values in
the budget. In a minority of states the Governor has block veto power, a similar veto power to the U.S.
President.
3In most states the budget proposal is written either by an independent agency or by the Governor’s
oﬃce. It is then sent to the Legislature where it can be amended at will conditional on a balanced
budget. Once it is approved, the Governor may use their veto power. In most states the veto can be
overridden with a two-third majority in both state chambers. For more detailed information on state
budget procedures see the ‘Budget Process in the States’ at the National Association of State Budget
Oﬃces (NASBO) website (www.nasbo.org).
2residual claimant of a tax increase. We call the institutional feature that stops the agent
who sets the tax level from being the full residual claimant of a tax increase, budgetary
separation of powers.4
What determines the tax level in our model is the size of the overlap between the
districts that support the Governor and the districts that belong to the majority party in
the Legislature. Only districts within this overlap receive positive transfers in equilibrium.
As expected, our model predicts that an aligned government, i.e. where both the Governor
and the Legislature are controlled by the same party, has a higher tax level than that
of a divided government. Our model also shows that as the size of the majority in the
Legislature increases above 50% of seats, the size of the overlap also increases, bringing a
rise in the tax level. This occurs regardless of whether the majority is of the same party
as the Governor or, counter-intuitively, of the opposing party.
As in Grossman and Helpman (2008), we model the degree of alignment between the
two branches of government by focusing on the size of the overlap between two groups of
voters: those that support the Executive and those that support the Legislature. In con-
trast to Grossman and Helpman (2008),5 our model describes the budget as a sequential
bargaining game: the Legislature makes an oﬀer and, subsequently, the Governor may
cut down or trim items. Unlike the executive in their model, the Governor in ours does
not have the power to increase or propose transfers to districts. Whereas party identity is
absent in Grossman and Helpman (2008)’s model, party identity plays a key role in ours.
This is so even though we choose to assume that parties have no intrinsic preferences for
certain tax levels.
Our assumption that the two main American parties have no intrinsic preferences
4The concept of budgetary separation of powers diﬀers from the traditional way separation of powers
has been deﬁned: a separately elected executive that does not depend on a vote of conﬁdence by the
legislature (see for example Lijphart (1999) and Shugart and Carey (1992)).
5In Grossman and Helpman (2008) model, the legislative branch deﬁnes a spending limit and ‘ear-
marks’ certain projects in order to maximize the utility of the legislative branch’s constituency. Random
shocks to each project’s productivity are realized after the proposal by the legislative branch has been
made, but before the executive branch acts. Having observed the productivity shocks, the executive
branch implements a budget to maximize the utility of its constituency, while still respecting both the
limit and earmarked projects imposed by the legislative branch.
3regarding the size of government comes from a few recent results. Ferreira and Gyourko
(2009) and Gerber and Hopkins (2011) ﬁnd no evidence that the partisan identity of the
Mayor has an eﬀect on government size. De Magalh˜ aes (2011) ﬁnds no evidence that
the partisan identity of the majority in state Houses has an eﬀect on government size.
Besley and Case (2003), Reed (2006), and Leigh (2008) ﬁnd no evidence that the party
identity of the Governor aﬀects the tax level.
We propose a model where parties have no clear preferences as to the size of govern-
ment (they may have preferences over other ideological issues), and we present evidence
that suggests that such nonpartisan model is able explains the relationship between the
tax level and the degree of alignment between the Governor and the Legislature.
A key feature of our model is the line-item veto. The line-item veto has previously been
modeled by papers such as Holtz-Eakin (1988) and Carter and Schap (1990). Both these
papers use spatial models, in which the closer an implemented policy is to a politician’s
bliss points the higher is their payoﬀ. In these instances, veto power allows the Governor
to bring the implemented policy closer to their bliss point. Since bliss points can, in
principle, be anywhere within the space, these models show no clear prediction of how the
line-item veto could aﬀect the size of government. Should a Governor have a preference
for a large or small government, the presence of a strong veto power should help them to
achieve this.
In our model, neither politicians nor voters have spatial bliss points relating to the
size of government. As a result, the sequential bargaining game delivers clear and testable
predictions on how the line-item veto aﬀects the size of government. In the states with
the line-item veto as we move from a uniﬁed to a divided government, the tax level should
go down. For the states with the block veto our model predicts no discontinuity in the
tax level and we we ﬁnd none in the data.
A vast literature has looked at the eﬀect of divided governments and institutional fea-
tures in the American states. Some examples are Poterba (1994), Alt and Lowry (1994),
Bohn and Inman (1996), and Alt and Lowry (2000). In particular, Abrams and Dougan
4(1986), Holtz-Eakin (1988), Alm and Evers (1991), and Besley and Case (2003) have
looked speciﬁcally at the line item veto. Our contribution is to focus on the non-linearities
of this relationship and to implement a regression discontinuity design to try and deter-
mine whether the relationship is causal.
Our model also relates to the literature that has attempted to test the hypothesist
that the separation of powers has a negative eﬀect on government size. The result in
Persson and Tabellini (2004) that a Presidential regimes induces a smaller government
did not prove robust to the extension of the sample by Blume et al. (2009) and, to the
best of our knowledge, has not been replicated elsewhere. By applying the insights from
Persson et al. (2000) to the American states, we ﬁnd support for the hypothesis that
budgetary separation of powers has a negative eﬀect on the tax level.
In section 1 we present our model in detail. In section 2 we set out to test whether the
data rejects the non-linear relationship predicted by our model. In section 3 we conclude.
1 Model
1.1 Districts
A state is composed of N districts. Each district casts two votes, one to determine the
legislative majority and one for Governor. In each election, a district chooses between Left
and Right. We rule out the possibility that individuals within a district divide their vote
for Governor between diﬀerent candidates. Our intention is to capture in the simplest way
possible the degree of alignment between representatives and the Governor. By keeping
the district as the unity of analysis, we are able to model government redistribution
with simple district-speciﬁc transfers. Another option would be to allow the government
to also provide state-wide goods so that the Governor can cater for their across-districts
constituency; this would further complicate to the model without altering its main insight.
We assume districts have lexicographic preferences regarding ideology and monetary
transfers. If an ideological issue is a key component of a particular election (e.g. abortion
5rights, death penalty, right to bear arms, etc.), some districts may decide their vote
on ideological grounds and ignore how an ideological vote may inﬂuence the amount of
transfers they will receive. For other districts the ideological component of the election
may not be as salient and, therefore, these districts will only take into account their
monetary welfare. We assume the fraction of ideological districts for each party in each
election is exogenous and less than 50%, so that there are no ideological majorities.
Since the focus of this paper is to explain how the bargaining game between the
Governor and the Legislature aﬀects the size of government, we will abstain from modeling
the ideological vote in detail. Instead we will make two assumptions regarding the voting
behavior of districts that vote for ideological reasons and one regarding the information
available to politicians.
Assumption 1. We do not allow districts to vote for the Left for ideological reasons in
one election and for the Right in the other election also for ideological reasons.
Assumption 2. If a district votes for the Left (Right) for ideological reason in the
election with the least ideological votes for the Left (Right), then we assume that the
same district also votes for the Left (Right) for ideological reasons in the election with
the most ideological votes for the Left (Right).
The intuition for Assumption 2 is that if a district votes ideologically in an election
in which ideology is not salient (few districts vote ideologically), then it must be that the
same district also votes ideologically in the election where ideology is more salient (lots
of district vote for ideological reasons). Other than the cases speciﬁed by Assumption
1 and 2 districts may vote as independents in one election and ideological in the other
election.
Assumption 3. Neither the governor nor the legislative majority is able to observe
whether a district voted ideologically or as an independent, politicians can only observed
who the districts voted for.
6Assumption 3 implies that politicians can not exclusively target transfers to the in-
dependent districts, and can only discriminate among districts according to whom they
voted for.6
We now focus on the main driving force of the model, transfers. When determining
its independent vote, a district will consider the following utility function:
Ui = y − τ + V (fi),
where y is an endowment equal to all districts;7 τ is the tax level imposed by the
government on every district; and V (.) is a continuous, twice diﬀerentiable, increasing,
and strictly concave function. With fi, we intend to capture the characteristics of a
targetable publicly provided good.8
We interpret fi as the small part of the budget that is discretionary and may be
targeted to districts at each period. In the data we observe that the tax level does not
change by much within the period we study.9 This is mostly due to the substantial
amount of the revenues being pre-committed to particular expenditures. It would be
straightforward to introduce a public good in the model whose beneﬁt is shared by all
districts and that corresponds to the bulk of state government expenditures. The levels of
fi in this case would be an addition to this state-wide expenditure, but the key component
of the variation in spending over the years.
6Assumption 3 could be extended to the districts themselves: each district may only observe its own
type and how the other districts vote. The model does not require a district to know the true type of
the other districts.
7By assuming that all districts have the same endowment, we want to shut down the redistributional
role that the tax level may have in unequal societies. The only diﬀerences between districts in our setup
are their political choices. We normalize y to 1.
8One example of such a good is a local infrastructure project. Another could be transfers to school:
one policy would be to invest more money in public schools; another would be to use the same money
on school vouchers. Even though both goods are non-partisan in design, they may eventually redirect
transfers to speciﬁc constituencies.
9See Table 1 in Section 2.1
71.2 Budget bargaining
The bargaining game takes place between two agents, the governor and the legislative
majority. Since our focus is on explaining the size of government in the US states,
we abstain from modeling ideological policy choices and focus exclusively on the policy
decision regarding the amount of transfers each district receives.
The objective function of either agent is to maximize the utility of all the districts that
support them. This is a simplifying assumption of the electoral process but it supported
on some empirical evidence. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) show that in the American
states the governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favor of areas that provide
them with the strongest electoral support in two ways: counties that traditionally give
the highest vote share to the governing party receive larger shares of state transfers to
local governments and, moreover, when control of the state government changes, the
distribution of funds shifts in the direction of the new governing party.
The budget is decided sequentially in two steps.10 First, the legislative majority makes
a proposal consisting of an fi for each district. In the second step, the proposal can be
vetoed by the Governor. The line-item veto allows the Governor to cut transfers to certain
districts altogether, or to trim the amounts. The outside option of this bargaining game
is f = 0, and we interpret this as a normalization where only the not-modeled-state-wide
public good is provided.
The legislative majority chooses the amount of transfers for each district fiL, which











10In most states the Governor or a budget agency produces the ﬁrst draft. We skip this step as once
the budget reaches the Legislature it can be amended at will. For more detail information for the budget
procedures in the states see the National Association of State Budget Oﬃces (NASBO) publication
‘Budget Process in the States’ at http://www.nasbo.org.
8where by i ∈ L we mean all the districts that are part of the legislative majority.
The Governor may only cut the transfers chosen by the legislative majority and there-
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where by i ∈ G we mean all the districts in the Governor’s support, which we deﬁne as
all the districts that have voted for the Governor in the gubernatorial election.
Proposition 1.1 Only districts that are both part of the legislative majority and part of
the Governor’s support receive positive transfers fi > 0 in equilibrium.
Proof There is an unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which at the last node, the
Governor vetoes to zero any transfers fiL to districts not in her support. For the Gover-
nor’s maximization problem any positive transfers to a district not in her support is a cost
in the form of a higher tax level. At the ﬁrst node, the legislative majority only assigns
positive transfers fiL > 0 to districts in the legislative majority for the same reason.
1.3 Elections
For each election (legislative and gubernatorial) we assume a one-shot game where, ac-
cording to their objective function, each party commits to maximizing the utility of all
districts that vote for that party.
In each election a fraction of districts will vote ideologically for the Right and a
fraction of districts will vote ideologically for the Left. Since we have ruled out ideological
majorities, we must focus on the independents to determine the election results.
Proposition 1.2 There are four pure-strategy Nash-equilibria: i) all independents vote
for the Left in both the gubernatorial and legislative elections, ii) all independents vote
9for the Right in both the gubernatorial and legislative elections, iii) independents vote
for the Left in the legislative election and for the Right in the gubernatorial election,
and iv) independents vote for the Right in the legislative election and for the Left in the
gubernatorial election.
Proof in the Appendix.
The intuition for this result is that independents face a coordination problem. All
that matters for a district voting independently is to be part of the majority. The
identity of the majority does not matter. By being part of the majority the district
can secure a higher monetary utility. Note that it does not matter whether the elections
are simultaneous or sequential, the coordination problem between independents occurs
even if they observe the result of the other election.
Corollary 1.3 In equilibrium we only observe one combination of vote splitting: either
[L,R] or [R,L], not both.
Proof in the Appendix.
Corollary 1 is not an unusual result. Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) ﬁnd a similar re-
sult in a model where individuals vote for purely ideological reasons. In their model, both
party and voter have an ideological bliss point. In order to implement an ideological po-
sition in between the parties’ preferred positions, voters may chose a divided government.
They show that only one type of vote-splitting is observed in equilibrium.
1.4 Graphically representing the overlap between Governor and
Legislature
Corollary 1 allows us to represent the predictions of our model neatly on a line. The
remaining results of the paper are presented graphically and not in the form of proposi-
tions.
Let’s call ng the set of districts that have voted for the Governor from the Left. We
stack the districts in the set ng from left to right in a [0, 100] line, so that |ng| also denotes
10a scalar: a point in the [0, 100] line. If the Governor from the Left won the election, the
set ng denotes the Governor’s support. If the Governor from the Right won the election,
the set 100 − ng denotes their support.
Without loss of generality, let’s assume that the Governor from the Left has won. To
give a concrete example, let’s assume that |ng| = 57. The districts in the interval (57,100]
have voted for the Right. In Figure 1, the ﬁrst horizontal arrow shows the districts in
the Governor’s support. The Governor’s arrow goes up to the 57% point. We then draw
a vertical line that crosses the three solid horizontal lines at the 57% point. The vertical
line indicates the Governor’s support in three diﬀerent cases.
We call nl the set of districts that have voted for the Left in the legislative election.
We also stack these districts from left to right. If |nl| ≥ 50, the Left has the majority
in the Legislature and the size of the majority is |nl|. If |nl| < 50, the Right has the
majority in the Legislature. The size of the majority in this case is |100 − nl|. We will
abuse notation from now on and adopt nl and ng to denote the set, its size, and a scalar:
the point in the [0,100] line.
In the ﬁrst case, where ng > 50 and nl > ng, the overlap is given by ng. As an
example, in Figure 1 we have chosen nl = 80; that is, 80% of the districts have voted for
the Left in the legislative election. The districts that have been stacked from the left to
the right up to ng = 57 have voted for both the winning Governor and the winning party
at the legislative election. They are the districts in the overlap between the Governor’s
support and the legislative majority.
In the second case, where ng > 50, nl > 50, and ng > nl, the overlap is given by
nl. As an example, we have chosen nl = 55. The number of districts that voted for the
Right in the legislative elections is higher than in the previous case – all those in the
interval (55,100). Because the majority in the Legislature is smaller than the Governor’s
support, the size of the overlap is given by the size of the legislative majority. The size
of the overlap is 55% of the districts.
In the third case, where ng > 50 and nl < 50, the overlap is given by ng − nl. The
11Left has lost the legislative election. The size of the support for the Left is nl = 30. The
size of the legislative majority is given by stacking the districts from the right; that is,
by 100 − 30 = 70. The size of the overlap between the Governor (from the Left with
ng = 57) and the legislative majority from the Right is given by 57 − 30 = 27.
12131.5 The overlap and the amount of transfers
From proposition 1.1 we know that only the districts that belong to the overlap (that is,
to both the Governor’s support and to the legislative majority) receive positive transfers
in equilibrium, whether the government is aligned or divided. Changes in the size of the
overlap determine the tax level. This is the main intuition of our separation-of-powers
model.
In Figure 2, we have chosen an example with ng = 57 . The Governor is from the
Left11 and has the support of 57% of the districts. In the x-axis we have nl; that is, the
number of districts that have voted for the Left in the legislative election. If the number
of seats from the Left in the Legislature is higher than 50% (nl > 50), we have an aligned
government; if the number of seats from the Left in the Legislature is less than 50%
(nl < 50), we have a divided Government.
In the y-axis in Figure 2, we have the number of districts that receive positive transfers,
fi, in equilibrium; that is, the size of the overlap between the legislative majority and the
Governor’s support (which is ﬁxed at 57%).
Our objective is to model how the two branches of government bargain to decide on
the tax level. In the majority of states the Governor’s veto may be overridden with two-
thirds of the vote in the Legislature. We therefore focus on the interval in which the veto
power is active: ((33.3,66.6).12
Let’s ﬁrst look at the interval (33.3,50). Here the overlap is given by ng − nl, as
the Right has the majority of seats in the Legislature. As we move away from the 50%
point to the left towards the 33.3 point, the Right increases its share of seats in the
Legislature (nl decreases). As the number of seats controlled by the majority from the
Right increases (100−nl increases), the size of the overlap between the Governor’s support
and the legislative majority increases.
11This is without loss of generality. We could have determined the Governor to be from the Right and
restacked the districts from right to left instead.
12We have an extension of the model that takes into account how the tax level is determined outside
this interval. This version is available on the on-line appendix, appendix B.
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Figure 2: Degree of alignment between the Governor and the Legislature
We now look at the interval (50,57). Here, the overlap is given by nl. As we move from
the 50% point to the right, the percentage of seats that the Left has in the Legislature
(nl) increases. The size of the overlap between the legislative majority and the Governor’s
support increases as nl approaches 57 but levels out thereafter.
In the interval (57,66.6), the overlap is given by ng, which we have ﬁxed at 57 in this
example. The size of the overlap is constant, even though nl increases. In Figure 2, we
can see this with the horizontal line in the interval (57,66.6).
There is a discontinuous jump in the number of districts receiving positive levels of
fi when nl moves across the 50% point. Immediately to the left of the 50% point, the
size of the overlap between the Governor and a legislative majority from the Right with
50% of the seats is given by ng − nl; that is, 57 − 50 = 7%. In contrast, immediately to
the right of the 50% point, the size of the overlap between the Governor and a legislative
majority from the Left with 50% of the seats is given by nl; that is, 50%.
Figure 2 depicts most of the intuition of our model. For a Governor with a given
support, an increase in the size of the majority in the Legislature implies an increase in
15the overlap between the Governor’s support and the majority. This is the case whether
the legislative majority is from the same party as the Governor or from the opposition.
So far, our model generates a discontinuity at the 50% cutoﬀ and a positive relation-
ship between the tax level and the size of the majority around the 50% cutoﬀ. In the
next section, we explain why taxes may go down as the size of the majority increases
beyond a certain point.
1.6 Transfers and the tax level
The ﬁrst case is the one in which nl > 50, ng > 50, and ng < nl. This corresponds to
the interval nl ∈ (57,66.6) in Figure 2. The legislative majority acts ﬁrst. In choosing
the amount of transfers, they must internalize the cost of taxation for those districts
in nl that are not in ng. These receive zero transfers because the Governor will veto
any to districts not in ng. The internalization of the cost of taxation makes it so that
the majority chooses a tax level that is lower than the level that would be chosen by
the Governor, who only cares about the district in ng. Therefore, at the veto stage the
Governor does not improve the utility of the districts in his support by trimming transfers
to the districts in ng (but he would cut to zero any positive transfers to those outside
ng). In practice, the Governor decides which districts receive positive transfers and the
majority decides on the level of transfers.
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facing the constraint that only those in ng receive positive transfers,
s.t Nτ ≥ ngfi
fi ≥ 0 if i ∈ ng
fi = 0 if i ̸∈ ng.











Note here that for a ﬁxed ng, as nl increases the tax level goes down. This is true as long
as V(.) is strictly concave. As the majority in the Legislature exceeds the overlap with
the Governor, the extra districts do not get any transfer; all they do is force the majority
to internalize the cost of taxation even more.
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Figure 3: The tax level predicted by the model with V (f) = f9/10
The intuition for the other three cases are similar to case 1 and we present their
derivation in the appendix. We collect these results in Figure 3, where we can see the
relationship between the tax level and the percentage of districts in the Legislature that
are from the same party as the Governor, nl. We have kept the Governor ﬁxed at ng = 57
and have varied nl. The functional form we have chosen is V (f) = f
9
10. The point of
inﬂection depends on the size of the Governor’s support (ng). This implies that our model
can potentially rationalize diﬀerent shapes. If ng = 50, the function is decreasing as we
move away from the 50% cutoﬀ on either side. If ng is greater than 66.6, the function is
17increasing everywhere as we move away from the 50% cutoﬀ. The discontinuity at 50%
is present unless ng = 100.
The main intuition from this section is that taxes may go down as the size of the
majority in the Legislature outgrows the size of the Governor’s support. This is so
because a larger majority internalizes the cost of taxation more and therefore keeps the
level of transfers down in the ﬁrst place, leaving nothing for the Governor to veto.
1.7 States with the block veto
The predictions of our model hinge on the line-item veto power. To claim support in the
data for these prediction we must pass two important tests: i) the data for the states
with the line-item veto should not falsify the relationship described in Figure 3; ii) the
relationship should be diﬀerent in the data for the states with the block veto. In this
section we describe brieﬂy what our model predicts in the states with the block veto. The
key diﬀerence is that our model predicts no discontinuity in the tax level for the states
with the block veto; this is conﬁrmed in the data.
The ﬁrst thing to note is that the block veto is considerably more costly than the
line-item veto. The budget in the states with the block veto resembles more closely a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer with a costly outside option for the Governor: not only f = 0,
but also a potential government shut-down. During a shutdown, government employees
stay at home and all government-provided services stop, except for those within essential
areas.13 A block veto of the budget creates a stalemate in the budget process. In practice,
each state government deals diﬀerently with such a stalemate. Two of the states with
the block veto (North Carolina and New Hampshire) allow for continuing temporary
resolutions. Three others (Nevada, Virginia, and Washington) have no speciﬁc procedures
to deal with this eventuality, which means that a government shut-down is possible. In
the remaining states (Indiana, Iowa, Maine, and Vermont), a government shut-down is
13See NCSL document ‘Procedures When the Appropriations Act is Not Passed by the Beginning of the
Fiscal Year’: http://ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12616. For a detailed description of federal government
shutdowns see Meyers (1997).
18determined by state law in the case of a stalemate in the budget process. For simplicity,
we assume the block veto to be prohibitively costly.
By making the assumption that the block veto is prohibitively costly and because
we model the budget as a sequential bargaining game, the Governor plays no role in
the budget decision in the model for the block veto states.14 The majority will make a
proposal that leaves the Governor indiﬀerent between shutting down the government and
accepting the majority’s budget. In particular, the Governor will not be able to cut down
the pork barrel. The decision on the level of transfers is left to the Legislature alone.
The legislative majority is able to set the tax level and allocate resources. There is no
budgetary separation of powers in the states with the block veto, the legislative majority
is the residual claimant of a tax increase.
The problem is symmetric whether the majority is from the Right or from the Left.
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The tax level is decreasing in nl for a majority from the Left and decreasing in 100−nl
for a majority from the Right. The highest tax level is at 50%. As the majority increases,
more districts internalize the cost of taxation and the tax level decreases. This is true as
long as V (.) is strictly concave. Also note that the model predicts no discontinuity in the
tax level at the 50% cutoﬀ. In Figure 4, we can see the results of the model graphically
for the functional form V (.) = f
9
10.
14In most states the Governor or a budget agency produces the ﬁrst draft. We skip this step as once
the budget reaches the Legislature it can be amended at will.







































Figure 4: The tax level predicted by the model with V (f) = f9/10
(states with the block veto)
2 Empirics
2.1 Data
Our data set comprises the American states from 1960 to 2006.15 The majority of Ameri-
can States (thirty-four) give their Governors line-item veto power and require a two-thirds
majority in the Legislature for this veto to be overridden. Since the model we present in
Section 1 presupposes a strong Governor with the power to cut transfers, we focus our
empirical analysis on these states.16 In section 2.10, we look at the states in which the
15Most of our political, ﬁscal, and population variables are the same as those used by Besley and Case
(2003). We are thankful to Timothy Besley and Anne Case for making their data sets available to us.
We have updated their sample from 1960 to 1998 with data from 1999 to 2006. We have used data
from the Census Bureau, the National Association of State Budget Oﬃces (NASBO), and the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)
16In total there are 50 states. Most states have the line-item veto throughout, but some adopted it
within the period covered by our sample. They enter our sample at the time of adoption. We exclude
the six states with the block veto throughout our sample. These are Indiana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Rhode Island and Vermont. We exclude the states that have the line-item veto but
that have other majority requirements for a veto override (usually 50%). These are Alabama, Arkansas,
Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee. California is excluded because it requires a two-third majority to approve
the budget. We have also excluded Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska, and Minnesota because of missing data.
This leaves us with 34 states in our line-item-veto sample making 1,524 observations.
20Governor has block veto.
Our variable for the tax level is taxes GDP, It is deﬁned as the sum of state in-
come, corporate, and sales taxes divided by state GDP. In line with Persson and Tabellini
(2004), we focus on government size relative to GDP. For our robustness checks we show
results using the expenditure levels as an alternative measure of government size. Ex-
penditure is not our preferred measure as it contains both federal transfers and local
property taxes revenues, which are not decided at state level. The average tax level in
an American state is around 5.5% of GDP, whereas the average state expenditure level
is around 10% of GDP. 17
For another robustness check, we show results with an alternative measure for the tax
level: state taxes per capita. However, it is important to note that taxes per capita is
considerably less stationary than tax revenues over GDP. This can be seen in Table 1.
The average taxes per capita across states with the line-item veto in 1982-dollars during
the 1960s is $346. This jumps to $580 in the 1970s and continues to increase thereafter.
Table 1: Diﬀerent measures of the states’ tax level
Measure 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
States with the line-item veto
state taxes per capita (1982-dollars) 346 588 673 838 911
state taxes over state GDP (%) 4.4 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.7
States with the block veto
state taxes per capita (1982-dollars) 361 560 658 804 864
state taxes over state GDP (%) 4.6 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.4
Note: The sample in the ﬁrst three lines comprises 1524 observations of states with the
line-item veto from 1960 to 2006. In the bottom three lines the sample comprises 292
observations of state with the block veto from 1960 to 2006. Each observation represents a
state within a year. The tax level is measured as the total sum of a state’s income, sales,
and corporate taxes. Each entry is the average of all observations within a decade.
In Table 1, we can see that the average tax level in states with the line-item veto is
very similar to those with block veto. Our model, however, predicts that the tax level
should be higher in states with the block veto, and that this diﬀerence should be greater
17Another potential dependent variable would be transfers received by district. Unfortunately iden-
tifying district level expenditure is not easy. Some new data has been produced by Aidt and Shvets
(2011). They are able to identify district level expenditure to seven states from 1993 to 2004.
21around the interval in which the Governor’s party has around 50% of the seats. In Table
2, we can see that a state’s average tax level is 7% higher in states with block veto than
in states with the line-item veto. This diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 2: The states’ tax level in the interval Governor’s strength∈ [45,55]
block veto line-item veto diﬀerence SE
state taxes over state GDP (%) 5.7 5.4 0.32 (0.16**)
Note: Observations are a state in a year between 1960 and 2006. There are 279 observations
for the states with the line-item veto in the interval Governor’s strength∈ [45,55]. Gov.
strength is deﬁned as the minimum between the percentage of seats in the state House of
Representatives and in the state Senate that belong to the same party as the Governor.
There are 66 observations for the states with the block item veto in the interval Governor’s
strength∈ [45,55]. The tax level is measured as the total sum of a state’s income, sales,
and corporate taxes divided by state GDP.
2.2 Testing the non-linearities
As seen in Figure 3, our model predicts a non-linear and discontinuous relationship be-
tween the support that the Governor has in the Legislature (denoted by nl in the model)
and the tax level. Except in the limiting case in which ng = 100, we should observe a
discontinuity at nl = 50. Except in the limiting case in which ng = 50 the tax level should
increase as the size of the majority in the Legislature (either nl or 1−nl) increases in the
neighborhood of nl = 50. The model also predicts that the tax level should eventually
decrease as nl increases above ng.
To test whether these predictions are falsiﬁed by the data, we estimate a partially
linear model. We are interested in the relationship between the tax level and a variable
that we call Governor’s strength. Governor’s strength is deﬁned as the percentage of
seats that belong to the Governor’s party in the Legislature – be the Governor Repub-
lican or Democratic. This variable is the empirical equivalent of nl in the model: the
percentage of seats in the Legislature that belong to the same party as the Governor.
Governor’s strength will enter the model non-linearly, while state and year dummies, and
other covariates will enter the model linearly. We allow for the estimated function to be
discontinuous. We can then test whether the estimated discontinuity is signiﬁcant.
22There are two chambers in each state18. To estimate the non-linear relationship we
deﬁne a government as divided if at least one chamber in the Legislature is at the hands of
the opposition to the Governor. We, therefore, measure Governor’s strength as being the
minimum value between the percentage of seats held by the Governor’s party in the state
House and in the state Senate. If the minimum is above 50%, both chambers are aligned
with the Governor. If Governor’s strength is below 50%, the government is divided.19
In Table 1, we see that the average government size has remained stable since the
1970s. We interpret our model as capturing small deviations from the mean government
tax level at each year. Our empirical estimation reﬂects this interpretation.
We control for: state and year ﬁxed eﬀects; state population; state income per capita
(in 1981 dollars); an indicator variable for whether the state has a supermajority require-
ment for a tax increase in that year; and an indicator variables for whether the state has
expenditure limitations by law in that year. Our main concern is an omitted variable
for the voters’ political preferences and how they change overtime and across states; the
tax level may be chosen in response to changes in these preferences. We therefore add
three control variables as proxies for these preferences: a measure of turnout in the last
election; an indicator variable for whether the last election was a midterm election or a
general election; and an indicator variable for the political identity of the Governor.
The semiparametric model is summarized as:
taxes GDPst = β
′X + f(Governor
′s strengthst) + ϵst,
where all of the control variables mentioned in the above paragraph enter linearly in X
together with state and year dummies. Each observation is a state, denoted by s, in a
year, denoted by t.
18With the exception of Nebraska.
19A few observations have independent representatives. We deﬁne the Governor’s strength based on
the number of representatives belonging to the same party as the Governor. Independent representatives
count as the opposition. Independent Governors have values of Governor’s strength=0 by deﬁnition as
we can not identify the party identity of independent representatives.
232.3 Estimation procedure
The easiest way to estimate this model is to include a power series for the variable
Governor’s strength; one series for each side of the cutoﬀ. The result of this procedure can
be seen in Table 3. To determine the degree of each series we stopped adding terms when
the extra term was not precisely estimated. This procedure yields a quartic-polynomial
to the left of the 50% cutoﬀ and a quadratic-polynomial to the right. The discontinuity
in the function at the cutoﬀ Governor’s strength=50% is statistically signiﬁcant. The
result implies an increase in the tax level in the order of 6% at the 50% cutoﬀ. We
have performed a series of robustness checks that are available on the on-line appendix,
appendix B: the shape and discontinuity of the function are robust to being estimated
without any controls, with state and year dummies only, with diﬀerent combinations of
controls, to excluding the observations in which a supermajority requirement for a tax
increase is in place, to excluding the southern states, and to estimating the function with
an alternative dependent variable: the state tax level per capita.
A potential issue with the power series estimator is that it may be sensitive to the
polynomial degree. We have therefore implemented a semiparametric procedure as pre-
sented by Robinson (1988), usually called the partially linear model. The non-linear part
is estimated non-parametrically, so that we do not impose any restrictions on its actual
shape. The linear part of the model is estimated as in any linear model. We describe the
estimation procedure of the non-parametric part of the model in the Appendix.
2.4 Governor’s strength and the tax level
The results of both estimation procedures can be seen in Figure 5.20 The solid line plots
the function estimated with the power series and the crosses are the point estimates of
the semiparametric procedure. The dots are the local averages from the semiparametric
20If the density of g is zero or close to zero at any point, the estimator is unreliable. We follow Robinson
(1988) and solve this problem by trimming 1% of the lowest density points of g. This trimming makes
the sample in which we run the power series and the semiparametric method not identical. In the tables
we have not performed the trimming. The estimates with and without trimming are virtually identical.
24Table 3: Dependent Variable: taxes GDP
constant 6.79
(0.81)***
Gov. strength × (1 − right) 15.81
(5.24)***
Gov. strength2 × (1 − right) -138.78
(45.14)***
Gov. strength3 × (1 − right) 409.39
(134.39) ***
Gov. strength4 × (1 − right) -388.36
(128.40)***
right(1 if Gov. strength > 50) 2.58
(1.14)**
Gov. strength × (right) -6.82
(3.12)**
Gov. strength2 × (right) 5.09
(2.20)**
Discontinuity 0.33
at Gov. strenth=50 (0.16)**
R-squared 0.84
Note: This sample comprises 1524 observations of states with the line-item veto and an
override requirement of two-thirds from 1960 to 2006. Standard errors in parenthesis are
clustered by state (34 groups). The symbol ∗ means that the estimated coeﬃcient is
signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗ ∗ ∗ signiﬁcant at 1%. The control variables
in the above regression are: state and year dummies, state population, state income per
capita, an indicator variable for whether the state has a supermajority requirement for
a tax increase in that year, an indicator variables for whether the state has a binding
expenditure limitations in that year, an indicator variable for whether the election was
midterm, an indicator variable for the party identity of the Governor, and turnout in the
last election. The estimated function is plotted in Figure 5 with a solid line.
25procedure.
The Governor’s power in our model is to veto the budget. In most states their veto
may be overridden by a two-third majority in the Legislature. We have therefore focused
our model on the interval Governor’s strength ∈ (33.3,66.6). Note that in Figure 5 the
tax level increases when we move away from the 70% mark or as we move away (leftwards)
from the 30% mark. This is interesting because these inﬂection points are close to the
requirement for the majority in the Legislature to override the Governor’s veto. This
suggests that the mechanism that determines the tax level is diﬀerent where the veto is
active to where it is not. In the main text we focus our discussion on the shapes in the
interval we analyzed in section 1: (33.3,66.6). We have an extension of our theoretical
model that is able to rationalize the shapes we estimate for the whole of the support, this
extension is available in the supplemental material.
Figure 5: Semiparametric estimation: state tax level and Governor’s strength
Governor’s strength: seats held in the Legislature by the Governor’s party (%) - min{House, Senate}




































In Figure 5 we can see that the tax level is on average higher on the right side of the
graph, where the same party controls both the Governorship and the Legislature. The
discontinuity at Governor’s strength = 50% is positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
Note that as we move away from the 50% cutoﬀ either to the left or to the right, the
26semiparametric estimates show taxes ﬁrst rising and then falling, before picking up again
in the intervals (66.6,100) and (0,33.3). The power series estimates are similar to the
left of the cutoﬀ, but to the right of the cutoﬀ the estimated function is decreasing in the
interval (50,66.6).
These estimates are in line with the predictions or our model in Figure 3. From Table
3 we can see that the estimated shape for power series estimator is statistically robust
and so is the discontinuity. The main features of the function are also statistically robust
with the semiparametric method, which we discuss in the appendix.
Overall the shapes of the function we estimate in Figure 5 do not seem to reject the
non-linearities predicted in our model. The exact shape predicted by our model depends
on which districts have voted for the Governor. The function estimated semiaparametri-
cally closely resembles what our model predicts with ng = 57. A more thorough test of
our model would require data on the vote share of the Governor in each state district.
We have been unable to ﬁnd this level of detail in electoral data across the states and
across time to pursue this project further.
2.5 Regression discontinuity design
In this section we discuss whether we can implement a regression discontinuity design
to the jump in the tax level we observe in Figure 5 at Governor’s strength=50%. As nl
crosses the 50% cutoﬀ from left to right the government goes from divided to uniﬁed and
taxes jump up. If we can show that slim majorities of one or two seats can be interpret
as quasi-experiments (in the same way that close election have been, see for example Lee
(2008) and Caughey and Sekhon (2012)), we would be able to determine a clear causal
relationship between whether the government is uniﬁed or divided and the tax level.
This is an important complement to the result in Figure 5, which depends on a series of
parametric assumptions.
The estimation procedure for the regression discontinuity design is similar to that of
Figure 5 and Table 3, except that we do not include control variables or ﬁxed eﬀects in
27the estimation. We estimate one function on each side of the cutoﬀ. The solid line plots
the function estimated with the power series and the crosses are the point estimates of
the non-parametric procedure (a local linear regression, which is deﬁned in detail in the
Appendix). The dots are the local averages.
For the regression discontinuity design the forcing variable is Governor’s strength in
the House, which we deﬁne as the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives
that belong to the same party as the current Governor. The reason why the forcing
variable is Governor’s strength in the House and not Governor’s strength is because
elections for the state Senates do no lend themselves to a regression discontinuity design.
In the appendix we argue this point in detail.
The outcome variable is the state tax level. If the forcing variable is above 50%,
the observation receives treatment. The treatment is an “uniﬁed government”. At each
period, a state is either assigned the treatment or not. For the observations in which
the election for the state House delivered a slim majority, we argue that the assignment
of treatment was as if it were random. If this is the case, diﬀerences in the average tax
level between the treated group and the control group are an estimation of the treatment
eﬀect.
2.6 Discontinuity in the tax level
Our result for the regression discontinuity design is summarized in Figure 6 and Table
4. Since we are focusing on the 50% cutoﬀ, we estimate the discontinuity with all states
that have the line-item veto, and not only those with two-thirds override rule.
We estimate a statistically signiﬁcant jump in the tax level around the cutoﬀ point:
Governor’s strength in the House = 50%. To the right of the cutoﬀ point, the government
is uniﬁed; to the left, the government is divided. The parametric quartic speciﬁcation
and the local linear regression 21 yield very similar results: a discontinuity of around
21Nonparametric results are sensitive to bandwidth choice. Imbens and Kalyararaman (2009) propose
a method to calculate an optimal bandwidth speciﬁcally for regression discontinuity design. Because most
of our data seem to be concentrated around the 50% cutoﬀ (see Figures B1 and B2 in the Appendix),
280.67. This is signiﬁcant at the 1% level with heteroskedastic robust standard errors,
and signiﬁcant at the 10% level with standard errors robust to clustering by state. For
presentation purposes we only report the cluster-robust standard errors. An estimate
of 0.67 implies an increase in the average tax level from 5% to 5.67% of GDP - a 13%
increase. The result is robust to excluding one state at at time, so that we know the
result does not depend on any single state, and to excluding one decade at a time; these
are available on the on-line appendix, appendix B.
Table 4: State tax level and Governor’s strength in the House
Method Jump at 50% Bootstp mean SE
4-degree polynomials 0.69 - (0.35)*
LLR(bandwidth 7) 0.66 0.60 (0.36)*
Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto from 1960 to
2006. Theoretical cluster robust standard errors are provided for the polynomial regression
together with bootstrapped cluster-robust standard errors by state for the nonparametric
regression (wild bootstrap with 10,000 draws each).
Governor’s strength - Seats held in the House by the Governor’s party (%)


























Figure 6: Nonparamtric: state tax level and Governor’s strength in the House









In Figure 6, we focus on the data surrounding the discontinuity. One can see the
statistical strength of the estimated discontinuity: the parametric and nonparametric
we apply their method to the data within the medians of the samples to the left, and to the right of the
50% cutoﬀ. The optimal bandwidth for the subsample between the two medians is 7.
29estimates to the left of the cut oﬀ point lie below all of the local averages to its right in
the interval (50, 65], with one exception. The outlier local average at the 55% mark is
due to two observations: Ohio in 1965 with a tax level of 2.8%, and Ohio in 1966 with
a tax level of 2.8%. Similarly, the estimate to the right of the cutoﬀ is higher than most
of the local averages to the left, with the exception of a few that are far from the cutoﬀ.
Note also in Figure 6 the negative slope to the left of the 50% cutoﬀ. Our model in
Section 1 provides a rational for feature of the data.
It is interesting to compare the result in Figure 6 with the results in De Magalh˜ aes
(2011), where the author presents a regression discontinuity estimate in the same sample
but where the forcing variable is the percentage of seats the Democrats have in the state
House. De Magalh˜ aes (2011) ﬁnds no jump in the tax level at the 50% cutoﬀ point, which
indicates no causal relationship between the partisan control of the state House and the
tax level. Considering our result and the result in De Magalh˜ aes (2011) it seems that
the tax level is determined by whether the government is divided or uniﬁed, and not by
whether the Democrats or the Republicans are in power.
2.7 Checking the validity of the design
To test for the validity of the design, it is important to check if any other covariate is
discontinuous at the 50% cutoﬀ. If this were the case, it could indicate that the “random-
ization” did not work. In Table 5, we show that there are no signiﬁcant discontinuities
for most of the covariates.
Row 1 in Table 5 shows that observations on both sides of the cutoﬀ are as likely to
have a Senate aligned with the Governor as in opposition to the Governor. This is an
important result. Even though the Senate role in setting the budget is as important as
that of the House, around the cutoﬀ at least, the discontinuous change in political control
comes from the House only. Row 2 shows a similar result for a variable indicating the
partisan identity of the Governor.
As Table 5 demonstrates, there are no discontinuities in variables such as turnout, on
30Table 5: Other covariates and Governor’s strength in the House - quartic-polynomial
speciﬁcation
Variable Jump at 50% SE
Governor’s party control over the Senate -0.05 (0.14)
Democratic Governor -0.21 (0.14)
Turnout -0.03 (0.03)
Midterm election -0.09 (0.11)
Population 0.75 (1.67)
Income per capita 0.19 (0.84)
Unemployment rate 0.00 (0.44)
Local property taxes -0.12 (0.37)
Tax and expenditure limitations -0.05 (0.13)
Supermajority requirements -0.15 (0.09)*
Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto from 1960
to 2006. The forcing variable is Governor’s strength in the House, which is the percentage of
seats in the state House of Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor.
The discontinuity is estimated at Governor’s strength in the House = 50% with a 4-degree
polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ. Theoretical cluster-robust standard errors by state
are in parenthesis.
the indicator variable for midterm elections, population, income per capita, local property
taxes, and on an indicator variable for for the presence tax and expenditure limitation.
We do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant discontinuity for an indicator variable for a supermajority con-
straint.22 This discontinuity is not robust to the non-parametric speciﬁcation and the
main result in Table 4 is robust to excluding the 240 observations with supermajority
requirements. We therefore do not see this as a threat to the validity of the design.
2.8 Empirical test for the states with the block veto
If it is indeed the case that the line-item veto is a key feature in explaining the tax level
as our model predicts, it must be that the empirical relationship between Governor’s
strength and the tax level be diﬀerent in the states with the block veto. We show in
22In principle, when such a requirement is adopted, it is no longer enough to hold 50% of seats
to formally raise the tax level, which makes dealing with the observations that have supermajority
requirements more problematic than dealing with other covariates. One option for dealing with the 240
observations with supermajority requirements is to drop them entirely, which does not change the results.
Another option would be to deﬁne the forcing variable as the distance from the cutoﬀ so that the 66.6%
cutoﬀ is pooled with the 50% cutoﬀ. However, in the states with supermajority requirements, the budget
is still approved by a simple majority. The two cutoﬀ points are not directly comparable.
31this section that this is indeed the case. The states with a block veto are a in minority
in comparison to those with the line-item veto and there are only 290 observations. In
Table 6, column 1, we present the results for the power-series estimates of the function
and discontinuity without any controls or ﬁxed eﬀects. In column 2 we include state and
year dummies and the same controls as in Figure 5.
In Table 6 we can see that the shape of the estimated function is not robust to the two
diﬀerent speciﬁcations. This may be due to the small numbers of observations. Since we
can not robustly estimate a functional form for the states with the block veto, it becomes
hard to test the prediction of our model regarding the shape of the relationship between
the tax level and Governor’s strength. The graph for both functions in column 1 and 2
are available on the online appendix, appendix B.
An important prediction of our model regarding the states with the block veto is that
there should be no discontinuity in the tax level at the cutoﬀ Governor’s strength=50%.
In Table 6 we can see that this is the case. The discontinuity is not signiﬁcant whether
we include controls and ﬁxed eﬀects or no controls at all. Moreover, the point estimate
of the discontinuity once we have included controls and ﬁxed eﬀects is close to zero. This
results lends support to the interpretation of our model, that it is the line-item veto that
generates the budgetary separation of powers in the states.




Gov. strength × (1 − right) -1.85 8.03
(7.72) (2.61)***
Gov. strength2 × (1 − right) 6.26 -11.04
(19.30) (3.73)***
right(1 if Gov. strength > 50) 19.30 -0.40
(4.71)*** (1.55)
Gov. strength × (right) -57.64 5.28
(13.47)*** (4.50)
Gov. strength2 × (right) 41.77 -3.99
(9.65)*** (3.24)
Discontinuity 0.28 -0.02
at Gov. strenth=50 (0.37) (0.13)
Controls No controls State and Year Dummies
and additional controls
R-squared 0.08 0.93
Note: This sample comprises 290 observations of states with the block veto from 1960 to
2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable is the total
sum of a state’s income, sales, and corporate taxes divided by state GDP and shown as a
percentage. The explanatory variable is Gov. strength, which is the minimum between the
percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives and in the state Senate that belong
to the same party as the Governor. The variable right takes value 1 if Gov. strength> 0.5
and zero otherwise. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity. The
symbol ∗ means that the estimated coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%;
∗ ∗ ∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
3 Concluding Remarks
The hypothesis that the separation of powers has an aﬀect on the tax level as predicted
by Persson et al. (2000) had so far only been tested indirectly. The empirical work has
focused on Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism, as Presidentialism is usually treated as
an equivalent concept to the separation of powers.
Persson and Tabellini (2004) focus on cross country data and have two main results.
The ﬁrst result, that a majoritarian electoral system leads to a smaller government, has
been replicated in a larger sample by Blume et al. (2009) and corroborates similar results
by Milesi-Ferretti and Perotti (2002). The second result, that a Presidential regimes
33induces a smaller government is not robust to the extension of the sample by Blume et al.
(2009) and, to the best of our knowledge, has not found support elsewhere.
Whereas these studies focus on Presidentialism as a proxy for the separation of powers,
Presidentialism does not imply budgetary separation of powers. In most Latin American
countries, for example, the President has both the power to determine expenditures and
to increases the tax level, sometimes by decree. In these countries the President decides
on the tax level and is the residual claimant of a tax increase.
In our model we have described how in the American states with the line-item veto, the
bargaining game between the Governor and the Legislature implies budgetary separation
of powers. We have also show how the eﬀectiveness of this separation depends on the
political conﬁguration at a given point in time. We have found empirical evidence that,
when it is eﬀective, the budgetary separation of powers does have a negative eﬀect on the
tax level. In particular we have found a clear jump in the tax level as the government
moves from divided to uniﬁed: taxes go up.
It is interesting to contrast our result with De Magalh˜ aes (2011), who ﬁnds no jump
in the tax level as the Democrats cross the threshold of 50% of the seats. This result
indicates no causal relationship between the partisan control of the state House and the
tax level. Brought together, the results in De Magalh˜ aes (2011) and our results suggest
that the tax level is determined by whether the government is divided or uniﬁed, and not
by whether the Democrats or the Republicans are in power.
34A Appendix
A.1 Proof Proposition 1.2
Proof The proof for all four pure-strategy Nash equilibria is the same. So let’s consider
the case where independents have voted for the Left in both elections.
First let’s consider a district that has voted as an independent in both election. As we
know from proposition 1.1, only districts that are part of the legislative majority and of
the Governor’s support receive positive transfers in equilibrium. Any deviation, that is,
voting for the Right in either election, implies that the district will receive zero transfers
instead of a positive amount.
Now let’s consider a district that has voted as an independent in one election and
ideologically in the other election. Note that given the lexicographic preferences, districts
do not deviate from their ideological vote. There are two cases. In the ﬁrst case suppose
the district votes for the Left in both election. Deviating (voting for the Right in the
independent election) implies that the district would go from positive to zero transfers.
In the second case suppose the district has voted for the Right in its ideological
election. Deviating (voting for the Right in its independent election) would not change the
fact that the district receives zero transfers in equilibrium. What does change, however, is
that the district is no longer counted in either the legislative majority (if its independent
election was the legislative election) or in the Governor’s support (if its independent
election was the gubernatorial election). Being part of a majority increases the monetary
utility of a district in equilibrium even if the districts receives zero transfers. This is
so because the majority (either the Governor or the legislative majority) will weight the
district’s utility when deciding the overall level of transfers. For a district that receives
zero transfer in equilibrium, taxation is only a cost; the optimal policy is τ = 0 and fi = 0
for all i. By being part of the majority this district marginally decreases the amount of
taxes it has to pay in equilibrium. For this reason such a district has no incentive to
deviate from voting with the winning majority in its independent election.
35A.2 Proof Corollary 1.3
Proof There are two cases to consider. The ﬁrst is the case of a divide government.
Without loss of generality, assume that the Left has won the ﬁrst election and the Right
has won the second election. There are three possible cases of vote splitting: [Lin,Rin],
[Lid,Rin], [Lin,Rid], where the subscript id is for a district that voted for ideological
reasons and in for a district that voted as an independent. Assumption 3 implies there
is no [Lid,Rid] or [Rid,Lid]. The other possible vote-splitting patterns are: [Rin,Lin],
[Rid,Lin], [Rin,Lid]. Neither of these three patterns occur in equilibrium because as we
know from proposition 1.1 all independents vote for L in the ﬁrst election and for R in
the second election.
The second is the case of an uniﬁed government: the same party won both elections.
Without loss of generality, assume that the Left has the majority in both elections.
This means that all independents have voted for L and that all the votes for R were
ideological. Also without loss of generality, let’s assume that in the ﬁrst election the
fraction of districts that voted for R was smaller than the fraction of districts that vote
for R in the second election. Since all independents voted for L only one pattern of
vote-splitting is possible: [Lin,Rid]. The alternative pattern would be [Rid,Lin], but this
pattern is ruled out by assumption 2: all districts that voted for R in the ﬁrst election
(where ideology is not as salient) must also vote for R in the second election (where
ideology is more salient).
A.3 Transfer and the tax level cases 2, 3, and 4
The second case is the one in which nl < ng and nl > 50. In our example, this is
the interval in which nl ∈ (50,57). Note that the size of the legislative majority is less
than the size of the Governor’s support. This implies that the Governor would like a
lower tax level than would the majority . This is so because some of the districts in the
Governor’s support are not oﬀered any transfers, and the Governor must internalize the
36cost of taxation for these districts, which are in ng but not in nl. In this case, at the veto
stage, the Governor will trim down transfers. In practice, the Governor chooses the level
of transfers and the majority chooses which districts receive positive transfers.





1 − τ + V (fi)
)
,
facing the constraint that only those in nl receive positive transfers,
s.t Nτ ≥ nlfi
fi ≥ 0 if i ∈ nl
fi = 0 if i ̸∈ nl.











Note that for a ﬁxed ng, as nl increases the tax level increases.
The third case is the one in which nl < 50, ng > 50, and 100 − nl < ng. This
corresponds to the interval in which nl ∈ (43,50). The legislative majority is from the
Right and has size 100 − nl. In this case, the size of the Governor’s support is larger
than the size of the legislative majority. A larger support implies that the Governor
internalizes more of the cost of taxation than the legislative majority. In practice, the
Governor chooses the level of taxation. The constraint is that only the districts in the
overlap, that is, ng − nl districts, receive positive transfers.





1 − τ + V (fi)
)
,
37facing the constraint that only those in ng − nl receive positive transfers,
s.t Nτ ≥ (ng − nl)fi.
s.t Nτ ≥ (ng − nl)fi
fi ≥ 0 if i ∈ ng − nl
fi = 0 if i ̸∈ ng − nl.











In this interval, for a ﬁxed ng, an increase in the size of the majority (that is, an increase
in 100 − nl) implies an increase in the tax level.
In the last case, nl < 50, ng > 50, and ng < 100−nl. This corresponds to the interval
in which nl ∈ (33.3,43). The government is divided but the size of the legislative majority
is larger than the size of the Governor’s support. This implies that the majority chooses
the level of transfers, with the constraint that only those in the overlap receive positive
transfers.





1 − τ + V (fi)
)
,
facing the constraint that only those in ng − nl receive positive transfers,
s.t Nτ ≥ (ng − nl)fi
fi ≥ 0 if i ∈ ng − nl
fi = 0 if i ̸∈ ng − nl.











In this interval, the eﬀect of an increase in the size of the majority (an increase in 100−nl)
has an ambiguous eﬀect on the tax level. As in the preceding case, an increase in 100−nl
has a positive eﬀect on the tax level through the term (ng − nl). On the other hand,
the eﬀect of an increase in 100 − nl through the term V −1
g (
100−nl
N ) is negative. If V (.)
is concave enough, the overall eﬀect is a decreasing tax level; otherwise the tax level
increases.
A.4 Non-parametric estimation
In this section we describe the non-parametric procedure to estimate both the non-
parametric component of the partially linear model we have described in section 2.1
and to estimate the discontinuity in section 2.8.
We use the local linear procedure as described in Pagan and Ullah (1999) p.93. Hahn et al.
(2001) argue that this method fairs batter in estimating a function with a discontinuity.











where K(.) is the kernel function, h the bandwidth, yi the dependent variable, gi the
forcing variable, and g the point at which we are estimating the local linear regression.
With s =
gi−g
h , the triangular Kernel is deﬁned as
K = (1 − |s|), for s ≤ 1 and 0 otherwise.
In words, the estimates of ˆ yo or ˆ xo at go are determined by running a linear regression
restricting the data to a bandwidth around go.
39For the parametric estimates, we present Huber-White standard errors robust to clus-
tering by state. To estimate cluster robust standard errors for the nonparametric esti-
mate, we use the wild cluster bootstrap. This does not require the residuals to be i.i.d.;
nor does it require each cluster to have the same size.23
A.5 Estimation of the partially linear model
One example of the use of the partially linear model is Schmalensee and Stoker (1999).
Their objective is to estimate the income elasticity of gasoline consumption in the U.S..
The non-parametric part of the model includes income and age, which are continuous,
while the linear part of the model includes the discrete variables such as geographical
dummies.
We estimate the model following the method described by Robinson (1988).24 To
discuss estimation, let’s rewrite the model as
y = β
′x + f(g) + ϵ.
The identifying assumption is that E(ϵ|x,g) = 0. In order to estimate β note that:
E(y|g) = β
′E(x|g),
and by diﬀerencing the two equations above we have:
y − E(y|g) = β
′(x − E(x|g)) + ϵ.
The ﬁrst step in the procedure is to estimate β. In order to so we need estimates for
E(y|g) and E(x|g). We follow Schmalensee and Stoker (1999) and use a kernel estimator.






















more on the wild bootstrap, see Horowitz (2001).
24The non-parametric part of the model can not be separately identiﬁed from a constant in X. So we
do not include a constant in X and we must also drop one state dummy and one year dummy.
40We use the local linear procedure as described above.
The diﬀerence in our estimation method to previous estimations of a partially linear
model is that we allow for a discontinuity in E(y|g). We impose a cutoﬀ at Governor’s
strength=50. In practice we impose a diﬀerent bandwidth to data near the cutoﬀ. To
give an example, our bandwidth of choice h = 15 25 implies that the estimation of ˆ y30 at
the point g=30 includes observations in the interval g ∈ [15,45]. For the estimation of
ˆ y− at g = 50 the bandwidth only includes observations in the interval g ∈ [35,50]. For
the estimation of ˆ y+ at g = 50 the bandwidth only includes observations in the interval
g ∈ (50,65].
Let the estimate of E(y|g) be denoted ˆ my(g) and that of E(x|g) be denoted ˆ mx(g).
Our estimate of β come from the OLS of yi − ˆ my(gi) on xi − ˆ mx(gi).
The last step of the procedure is to estimate the function f(g) by running another
local-linear regression of yi− ˆ β′xi on gi. We allow the estimate of f(g) to be discontinuous
at Governor’s strength=50.
For the parametric estimates, we present Huber-White standard errors robust to clus-
tering by state. To estimate cluster robust standard errors for the nonparametric esti-
mate, we use the wild cluster bootstrap. This does not require the residuals to be i.i.d.;
nor does it require each cluster to have the same size.26 Cameron et al. (2008) use Monte
Carlo simulations to show that the wild cluster bootstrap works well, particularly when
the number of clusters is small. As is shown in our results, the theoretical cluster robust
standard errors in the parametric estimates are similar to those estimated by the wild
bootstrap procedure with a local linear regression.
In Figure A1 We show the estimates for the slope coeﬃcients in Figure 5 in the paper
25Our choice of bandwidth comes from Imbens and Kalyararaman (2009) who propose a method to
calculate an optimal bandwidth in a non-parametric setting speciﬁcally for when the function is allowed
to be discontinuous. Their method yields a bandwidth of 15 when applied to the tax level and Governor’s
strength.






















resample the residuals 10,000 times for each regression. For more on the wild bootstrap, see Horowitz
(2001).
41and generate bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals around them. This is straightforward
because the local linear regression at each point gives us an estimate of the slope of the
function at each point (ˆ γ in footnote 16). The statistically signiﬁcant features of the
estimated function are a positive slope in the interval above 70%, a negative slope in the
interval around 20%, a negative slope immediately to the left of the 50% cutoﬀ, and a
negative slope around 60%. The local estimates of the slope for the remaining intervals
are not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Figure A1: Slope coeﬃcients of the non-parametric estimation between
the state tax level and Governor’s strength
Governor’s strength - Seats held in the Legislature by the Governor’s party (%) - min{House, Senate










































































































The reason our forcing variable is Governor’s strength in the House and not Governor’s
strength is that the Senate does not lend itself to a regression discontinuity design. In
Figures B1 and B2 we perform a common test of the validity of a regression discontinuity
design: we check the density of the forcing variable for a discontinuity at the cutoﬀ. The
density of Governor’s strength in the House is not discontinuous around the cutoﬀ. This is
an indication that voters are unable to manipulate the forcing variable at the cutoﬀ, that
42is, whether they deliver the House to the opposition or to the Governor’s party. We do,
however, observe a discontinuity in the density of Governor’s strength in the Senate. This
discontinuity in the density for Governor’s strength in the Senate implies that voters are
may be able to manipulate the forcing variable, that is, they may be able to deliberately
choose divided governments more often than uniﬁed government even around the cutoﬀ;
and if this is the case the Governor’s strength in the Senate can not be used in a valid
regression discontinuity design.
Governor’s strength - Seats held in the House by the Governor’s party (%)
































Figure B1: Histogram of forcing variable - Governor’s strength in the House








Governor’s strength - Seats held in the Senate by the Governor’s party (%)
































Figure B2: Histogram of forcing variable - Governor’s strength in the Senate








In this paper the regression discontinuity relates to slim majorities instead of close
elections (the latter being the usual approach, e.g. Lee (2008)). Another potential test
43for the validity of the design is to check whether a slim majority was itself the result
of close elections in a few districts. Otherwise we may have slim majorities of one seat
where every district was won in a landslide, in which case the slim majority can not be
considered as if it were a random electoral result. De Magalh˜ aes (2011) shows that for
the state Houses all slim majorities of one or two seat have at least one or two district
level election that were themselves a close election, but that this is not the case for the
state Senates.
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B.1 Extending the model to include the intervals (33.3) and
(66.6,100)
In the interval (33.3,66.6), only the districts in the overlap between the Governor’s sup-
port and the legislative majority receive positive transfers. In the intervals outside, since
the veto can be overridden, all of the districts in the legislative majority receive a positive
fi, with its value chosen by the majority. This feature would imply a decreasing tax level
as the size of the majority increases. In this section we allow for other types of transfers,
besides fi. These transfers behave according to a common pool problem.
To introduce this common pool element, we introduce two linear transfers. We think
of these transfers as pork-barrel, or the cost of doing business. If a representative is part
of the legislative majority, they appropriate a ﬁxed amount, li. If a representative belongs
to the Governor’s party, we assume that the Governor is able to transfer a value of gi
to this district, even if the Governor’s party is the minority in the Legislature. These
transfers are not aﬀected by the Governor’s veto power. Depending on the level of these
common pool goods they will imply an increase in the tax level even as the increase in
the majority is lowering the level of fi.
Keeping the functional form we have chosen in Figure 3, section 1.5 (V = f
9
10), we
add two linear transfers with values li = 170 and gi = 100. The main features we observe
in Figure 5 are present in Figure B1. Taxes are increasing as we move to the right in the
interval (66.6,100) and as we move to the left in the interval (33.3). Taxes are higher on
the right-hand side of the graph not only because of the results in sections 1.4 and 1.5 but
also because a district that is in the majority and that belongs to the Governor’s party
receives both l and g. On the left-hand side of the graph, however, a district receives
either l or g, but not both. The functional form assumption that we have made, together
with the speciﬁc values for li and gi, allow us to maintain the shapes in the interval
(33.3,66.6) as they were in Figure 3.
48This model predicts discontinuities at (33.3) and (66.6). Even if we allow for them in
the estimation, they are not statistically signiﬁcant. This may be due to a failure of our
model to explain the transition from where the veto sticks to the where it does not. It
may also be a small sample issue. As can be seen the histogram for Governor’s strength,
Figure B2. Most of the data lies in the interval (33.3) and (66.6). There may be too few
observations in which the legislative majority has overriding powers to eﬃciently estimate
these discontinuities predicted by the model.
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Figure B1: The tax level predicted by the model with V (f) = f9/10,
gi = 100, and li = 170
nl - percentage of districts from the Left in the Legislature
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Figure B2: Histogram of Governor’s Strength
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B.2 Robustness checks of the power series estimator
Table 7: Dependent Variable: taxes GDP
(1) (2) (3)
constant 4.69 6.23 3.37
(0.41)*** (0.20)*** (1.90)***
Gov. strength × (1 − right) 30.56 16.86 15.43
(14.37)** (5.80)*** (5.49)***
Gov. strength2 × (1 − right) -244.31 -141.56 -135.05
(111.99)** (49.62)*** (47.49)***
Gov. strength3 × (1 − right) 694.13 400.97 393.94
(304.01)** (144.67)*** (141.18)***
Gov. strength4 × (1 − right) -651.20 -369.93 -370.38
(273.23)** (136.10)*** (135.08)***
right(1 if Gov. strength > 50) 27.53 3.61 2.90
(14.41)* (1.38)** (1.13)**
Gov. strength × (right) -115.23 -10.45 -8.15
(60.58)* (3.88)** (3.19)**
Gov. strength2 × (right) 160.23 8.03 6.19
(83.61)* (2.70)*** (2.27)***
Gov. strength3 × (right) -72.08 - -
(37.99)* - -
Discontinuity 0.69 0.35 0.32
at Gov. strenth=50 (0.39)* (0.19)*** (0.16)**
Controls No controls State and Year plus population
Dummies and institution
Sample LIV LIV LIV
R-squared 0.02 0.84 0.84
Note: This sample comprises 1524 observations of states with the line-item veto and an
override requirement of two-thirds from 1960 to 2006. Each observation represents a state
within a year. The dependent variable is the total sum of a state’s income, sales, and
corporate taxes divided by state GDP and shown as a percentage. The explanatory variable
is Gov. strength, which is the minimum between the percentage of seats in the state House
of Representatives and in the state Senate that belong to the same party as the Governor.
The variable right takes value 1 if Gov. strength> 0.5 and zero otherwise. Standard errors
in parenthesis are clustered by state (34 groups). The symbol ∗ means that the estimated
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗ ∗ ∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table 8: Sample exclusion: South and Super-majority
Dependent Variable: taxes GDP (1) (2)
constant 6.42 6.53
(0.88)*** (0.78)***
Gov. strength × (1 − right) 18.72 18.25
(13.6) (10.6)*
Gov. strength2 × (1 − right) -169.10 -163.84
(83.76)* (75.90)**
Gov. strength3 × (1 − right) 506.77 482.26
(210.9)** (206.08)**
Gov. strength4 × (1 − right) -484.52 -454.79
(184.32)** (187.42)**
right(1 if Gov. strength > 50) 5.53 4.14
(2.20)** (1.59)**
Gov. strength × (right) -15.89 -12.14
(5.60)*** (4.00)***
Gov. strength2 × (right) 12.03 9.38
(4.16)*** (2.74)***
Discontinuity 0.44 0.39
at Gov. strenth=50 (0.19)** (0.19)**
Excluded observation Southern states state-years with a
super-majority requirement
R-squared 0.84 0.99
Note: The sample in column (1) comprises 1195 observations of non-southern states with
the line-item veto and an override requirement of two-thirds from 1960 to 2006. The states
excluded from the main sample are: Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Car-
olina, Texas, and Virginia. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by state (27 groups
in column (1) and 34 in column (2)). The symbol ∗ means that the estimated coeﬃcient
is signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗ ∗ ∗ signiﬁcant at 1%. The control variables
in the above regression are: state and year dummies, state population, state income per
capita, an indicator variable for whether the state has a supermajority requirement for a
tax increase in that year (in column (1) only), an indicator variables for whether the state
has a binding expenditure limitations in that year, an indicator variable for whether the
election was midterm, an indicator variable for the party identity of the Governor, and
turnout in the last election.
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Table 9: Alternative Dependent Variables
(1) (2)
Dependent var. taxes per capita expenditure/GDP
constant 122 16.13
(113) (1.83)***
Gov. strength × (1 − right) 1892 30.15
(625)*** (18.18)
Gov. strength2 × (1 − right) -16996 -273.56
(5410)*** (150.60)*
Gov. strength3 × (1 − right) 51294 801.05
(16118)*** (424.19)*
Gov. strength4 × (1 − right) -49454 -747.79
(15424)*** (389.63)*
right(1 if Gov. strength > 50) 156 5.79
(154) (2.64)**
Gov. strength × (right) -339 -15.75
(439) (7.4)**
Gov. strength2 × (right) 254 10.82
(310) (5.19)**
Discontinuity 31.73 0.50
at Gov. strenth=50 (18.68)* (0.32)
R-squared 0.93 0.99
Note: The sample in column (1) comprises 1524 observations of states with the line-item
veto and an override requirement of two-thirds from 1960 to 2006. The sample in column
(2) comprises 1553 observations of states with the line-item veto and an override require-
ment of two-thirds from 1960 to 1998. The dependent variable in column (1) is the total
sum of a state’s income, sales, and corporate taxes per capita in 1981 dollars. The depen-
dent variable in column (2) is the total state expenditure divided by state GDP. Standard
errors in parenthesis are clustered by state (34 groups). The symbol ∗ means that the
estimated coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%. The
control variables in the above regression are: state and year dummies, state population,
state income per capita, an indicator variable for whether the state has a supermajority
requirement for a tax increase in that year, an indicator variables for whether the state
has a binding expenditure limitations in that year, an indicator variable for whether the
election was midterm, an indicator variable for the party identity of the Governor, and
turnout in the last election.
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B.3 Regression Discontinuity Design - robustness checks
B.4 Excluding decades
Table 10: Tax level and Governor’s strength: one decade excluded at a time (4-degree
polynomial)






Note: This sample comprises state-years with the line item veto from 1960 to 2006. We
exclude one decade at a time. Each regression is run with 1369, 1342, 1342, 1346, and 1449
observations, respectively. The dependent variable is the percentage of the sum of income,
sales, and corporate taxes in a state divided by state GDP and shown as a percentage.
The forcing variable is Governor’s strength, the percentage of seats in the state House
of Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor. The discontinuity
is estimated at Governor’s strength = 50%. Each row shows the results for a 4-degree
polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ. Theoretical cluster-robust standard errors by state
are in parentheses.
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B.5 Excluding One State at a Time
Table 11: Tax level and Governor’s strength: one state excluded at a time (4-degree
polynomial)
Excluded Jump at 50% Cluster robust-SE Excluded Jump at 50% SE
AL 0.70 (0.35)* AZ 0.71 (0.35)*
CO 0.72 (0.36)* CT 0.74 (0.36)**
DE 0.73 (0.35)** FL 0.67 (0.35)*
GA 0.69 (0.35)* IA 0.65 (0.35)*
IL 0.64 (0.38)* KS 0.71 (0.36)*
KY 0.66 (0.36)* LA 0.66 (0.36)*
MA 0.57 (0.33)* MD 0.70 (0.35)*
MI 0.70 (0.38)* MO 0.65 (0.35)*
MS 0.74 (0.35)** MT 0.68 (0.37)*
ND 0.72 (0.37)* NJ 0.62 (0.35)*
NM 0.65 (0.35)* NY 0.71 (0.36)*
OH 0.71 (0.35)* OK 0.74 (0.35)**
OR 0.68 (0.36)* PA 0.97 (0.33)***
SC 0.71 (0.35)* SD 0.71 (0.36)*
TN 0.72 (0.36)* TX 0.62 (0.34)*
UT 0.69 (0.35)* VA 0.66 (0.35)*
WA 0.71 (0.37)* WI 0.55 (0.31)*
WV 0.66 (0.35)* WY 0.64 (0.36)*
Note: This sample comprises tate-years with line item veto from 1960 to 2006. Each
regression is run with 1665 observations. The ﬁrst exception is the regression excluding
Connecticut, that has 1669 observations, as Connecticut had fours years with an indepen-
dent Governor dropped. The regressions excluding Iowa, Washington and West Virginia
have 1674 observations each, as these states adopted the line item veto in 1969. The de-
pendent variable is the percentage of the sum of income, sales, and corporate taxes in a
state divided by state GDP and shown as a percentage. The forcing variable is Governor’s
strength, the percentage of seats in the state House of Representatives that belong to the
same party as the Governor. The discontinuity is estimated at Governor’s strength = 50%.
In each entry, we exclude from the sample the state in columns 1 or 3. Each row shows
the results for a 4-degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ. Theoretical cluster-robust
standard errors by state are in parentheses.
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B.6 Uniqueness of Discontinuity
Table 12: Tax level and Governor’s strength - alternative cutoﬀ points (4-degree polyno-
mial)












Note: This sample comprises 1712 observations of states with the line item veto from 1960
to 2006. Each observation represents a state within a year. The dependent variable is the
percentage of the sum of income, sales, and corporate taxes in a state divided by state GDP
and shown as a percentage. The forcing variable is Governor’s strength, the percentage of
seats in the state House of Representatives that belong to the same party as the Governor.
The discontinuity is estimated at diﬀerent cutoﬀ values of Governor’s strength. Each row
shows the results for a 4-degree polynomial on each side of the cutoﬀ. Cluster-robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
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B.7 States with the Block veto
Governor’s strength - Seats held in the House by the Governor’s party (%)


























Figure C1: Nonparametric: state tax level and Governor’s strength
in states with block veto








Governor’s strength - Seats held in the Legislature by the Governor’s party (%) - min{House, Senate}































Figure C2: Semiparametric: state tax level and Governor’s strength
(states with the block veto)
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